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TIMESHARING AND REALTY INTERESTS
UNDER THE MARTIN ACT: CONSUMER
OR INVESTOR PROTECTION?
I. Introduction
The popularity of condominiums' and cooperatives2 and other in-
novative types of real property ownership has resulted in the birth of
the timeshare.3  A purchaser of a timeshare-a member-purchases
any week or series of weeks in a condominium or cooperative for a
term of years. The owner then conveys a right to use, either as a
timeshare estate or a timeshare license. A timeshare estate conveys a
right to occupy, coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years.
A timeshare license, while conveying a right to use, does not convey a
freehold estate.5 The timeshare license, in particular, is based almost
1. A condominium is a system of separate ownership in fee of individual units in a
multiple unit building. See Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1964); People v. Board of Managers-New City Condominiums, 123 Misc.
2d 188, 474 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1984).
The New York Condominium Act, codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW, ART. 9-B,
§ 339-d et seq., was enacted in 1964, almost 6 years after Puerto Rico became the first
United States jurisdiction to adopt a condominium statute. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 339-d (Practice Commentary) (McKinney 1989). The Act provides, inter alia, that
each unit is real property. See id. § 339-g (McKinney 1989).
2. A cooperative apartment arrangement involves a hybrid proprietary interest of
the owner consisting of shares of stock in a cooperative corporation and a proprietary
lease. See Anton Sattler, Inc. v. Cummings, 103 Misc. 2d 4, 425 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1980).
Cooperative apartments are governed by N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW § 1-134 (McKinney
1951 & Supp. 1990).
Cooperatives are regulated as securities since they are "cooperative interests in realty."
See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
3. "Timesharing is a generic term used to describe the interval ownership of an in-
terest in real property .... To date, most real estate time-sharing has involved recreational
or resort property." See CLURMAN, ET AL., CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 156
(2d ed. 1984); see also infra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
4. See MODEL UNIFORM REAL ESTATE TIME-SHARE ACT § 1-102(14) (1985 &
Supp. 1990) [hereinafter MURETSA]; see infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
Since an estate-type timeshare involves fee ownership and is, consequently, a cooperative
interest in realty, this Note will focus upon timeshare licenses, particularly vacation
licenses and campground interests. For more information regarding timeshare estates see
M. HENZE, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF TIME SHARE RESORTS § 3.03 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter TIMESHARE BINDER]; Langer, "Fee time sharing," and Penwell "Structuring Fee
Timesharing Projects" in The Legal Aspects of Real Estate Timesharing, Practising Law
Institute at 25-210 (1982).
5. Timeshare licenses are also known as "vacation licenses." See MURETSA § 1-
102(18) (1985 & Supp. 1990); see infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. Club mem-
berships are also considered vacation licenses. See All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams, 68
N.Y.2d 81, 497 N.E.2d 33, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1986).
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completely on the terms of the timeshare agreement.6 A purchaser's
ability to convey or transfer his right, or even to choose the particular
unit for use or occupancy, may be restricted by the contract.7 More-
over, since a "license" is established, the owner conveys no interest in
the property.'
Many states, concerned about marketing practices9 and the impact
6. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. However, if exclusive possession is conveyed, a lease rather than a license may be
established by the contract. For a discussion of exclusive possession see infra notes 47-69
and accompanying text.
9. A major complaint in several states (and the cause of several lawsuits) in-
volves the techniques used in the initial sales of the timeshares. State lawsuits
against timeshare developers and marketers have included such allegations as:
misrepresentation of gifts and prizes offered, misrepresentation of the purpose
of the solicitation; failure to disclose material facts about the offering; 'high-
pressure'sales; and even 'verbal abuse' of consumers.
Bloch, Regulation of Timesharing, reprinted in The Legal Aspects of Timesharing, supra
note 4, at 298 [hereinafter Bloch].
The method by which a developer acquires prospective purchasers and the tech-
niques surrounding the sale play an important role in determining whether
community officials will accept or reject the industry as a whole ... [for exam-
ple] Hawaii recorded numerous public complaints arising from the manner and
intensity of sales activities of persons associated with the industry. Visitors in
the Waikiki district reportedly were being accosted by high-pressure salesper-
sons on beaches, sidewalks, and other public areas. Consequently, the Hawaii
timesharing statute was amended ... requiring ... disclos[ure of] the principal
office address, telephone number, and the responsible managing employee ... to
the Director of Regulatory Agencies.
Bilbray, Local Regulation of the Resort Timesharing Industry, reprinted in The Legal
Aspects of Timesharing, supra note 4, at 463 [hereinafter Bilbray].
[T]he National Timesharing Council (NTC) of the American Land Develop-
ment Association has recently adopted a tough new code of ethics by which all
members must abide. In an effort to demonstrate the industry's concern over
the use of unethical practices by a handful of operators, NTC has assumed the
role of the industry's toughest critic. As a result, continuing membership in
NTC has become one meaningful way to judge a developer's commitment to
fair and ethical practices.
MADISON & DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING, § 10.04(3) at S10-5
[hereinafter MADISON & DWYER] (Supp. 1988).
The New York Attorney General is also concerned about marketing practices:
Timeshare sales are often characterized by high-pressure sales tactics and mis-
leading advertising. Direct mail solicitations promising valuable premiums and
prizes are often used to lure prospective purchasers to the timeshare project
where they are subject to lengthy, deceptive presentations. Many people
quickly come to regret their purchase but have no way out.
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEGISLATIVE MEMO, No 298-89, at 2.
The New York State Attorney General's jurisdiction under General Business Law
§ 352-E extends to out-of-state developers entering the state to advertise or offer property
sales in other states. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-E(l)(a) provides: "It shall be illegal ...
for any ... corporation ... to make or take part in a public offering or sale in or from the
state of New York .. "; see also Ledgebrook Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 77 Misc. 2d 867, 354
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of timeshare units' ° on the neighborhood, have enacted enabling and
regulatory provisions.1 These statutory controls vary according to
each state' 2 and take the form of timeshare laws, subdivided land sales
acts, real estate commission acts, securities laws, "little FTC" acts
and consumer protection acts.13
New York State has chosen to regulate timesharing through its se-
curities laws. I4 New York's Blue Sky Law,"5 otherwise known as the
N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (1974); In re Cenvill Communities, 82 Misc. 2d 418, 419, 372
N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1975) ("Martin Act provisions apply equally to property located
within and without the State provided it is offered for sale in New York").
The Attorney General, under the authority granted it under General Business Law
§ 352-3(6), has also promulgated extensive regulations regarding condominium offerings
within the state. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, §§ 19.1 et seq.
10. Local governments have exhibited concern to many aspects of community life,
such as the impact on local housing, employment, public services, schools, police and fire
protection, transportation, parks and recreational facilities, noise and air quality, etc. See
Bilbray, supra note 9, at 461-62.
11. For an in depth state-by-state discussion of varying enabling and regulatory pro-
visions, see TIMESHARE BINDER, supra note 4, at § 9.03[2]; see also Bloch, supra note 9,
at 291.
12. For a classification of various state laws, see Ingersoll, State Regulation of
Timesharing, reprinted in The Legal Aspects of Timesharing, supra note 4, at 321 [herein-
after Ingersoll].
13. See Bloch, supra note 9, at 292; see also Ingersoll, supra note 12, at 321; Bilbray,
supra note 9, at 461.
Congress has also promulgated a consumer protection law, the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), applicable to the sale or lease of lots on unimproved land.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1976 & Supp. 1989). Developers are required to file a state-
ment of record with the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (OILSR) and to
provide the purchaser with a property report before the contract is signed. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1703(a)(1)(B) (1976 & Supp. 1989). The courts have applied the Act to the sale of
undeveloped condominium units. See Winter v. Hollingsworth Properties, 777 F.2d
1444, 1447 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Schatz v. Jockey Club Phase III, Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 537, 541
(S.D. Fla. 1985). For more information on the general purpose of the ILSFDA, see Flint
Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 778-83 (1976).
It is unclear, however, whether ILSFDA applies to timeshare units, especially right-to-
use licenses. "Lot" is defined as "any portion, piece, division, unit, or undivided interest
in land located in any state or foreign country if the interest includes the right to the
exclusive use of a specific portion of the land." See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1 (1987). Regard-
ing campground interests, the issue of exclusive possession is controlling. See infra notes
55-100 and accompanying text.
14. New York's position of securities regulation of timeshares is the minority posi-
tion; most states consider timeshares as an interest in real estate. For a discussion of New
York's minority view, see MADISON & DWYER, supra note 9, at §§ 10-16.
Nevertheless, "The staff of . . [New York State's] Department of Law has long indi-
cated that any form of timesharing may be considered such a 'cooperative interest' [in
realty]." See Bloch, supra note 9, at 298. Moreover, "[Martin Act] language is broad
enough to include offerings of many types, including ... various types of time sharing
arrangements .... See N.Y.GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (Practice Commentary) (McKin-
ney 1988).
15. "Since 1911, most states have enacted some form of legislation, generally known
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Martin Act, 16 requires the filing of an offering plan with the Attorney
General for any "participation interests or investments in . . . real
estate ventures. . . including cooperative interest in realty ..
"Cooperative interests in realty" include any individual ownership
in cooperatives, condominiums and homeowner associations."
Timeshare licenses, however, do not convey fee or individual owner-
ship in property. 19 Consequently, such licenses do not constitute co-
operative interests in realty, despite indications from the Department
of Law that timeshares may be considered such.20
Timeshare licenses, however, may qualify as "participation inter-
ests in realty" under the Martin Act. Since the statute does not
clearly define the term, great emphasis is placed upon the court's in-
terpretation of what constitutes a participation interest in realty. Spe-
cifically, it is unclear what role the potential for profit plays in
determining participation interests.
The New York Court of Appeals has attempted to define participa-
tion interests in realty by engaging in an "investment contract" analy-
sis, with an emphasis on profit potential.2 ' In All Seasons Resorts v.
Abrams (ASR III),22 the court held that the potential for profit was an
essential element in determining participation interests.23  At issue,
then, is whether a timeshare license that provides no potential for
profit constitutes a participation interest in realty, and thus is subject
to regulation under the Martin Act.
This Note will explore the property interests created by timeshare
as Blue Sky Laws, regulating the issuance and sale of securities." see I Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 30 (2d ed. 1961); See also 47 A.L.R.3d 1378, § 2.
16. The statute was named after Assemblyman Martin, who introduced the bill in
1921. It passed by unanimous vote in the same year. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e
(Practice Commentary (McKinney 1988).
17. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
18. From its use elsewhere in our statutory law, the phrase 'cooperative interest
in realty' has acquired a meaning which includes cooperatives, as the term is
usually understood, condominiums and interests in real estate owned through
home-owner associations .... The common element in... [cooperatives, condo-
miniums and homeowner associations is] that the individual holds some owner-
ship interests in the property.
All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 91, 497 N.E.2d 33, 38, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10,
15 (1986).
19. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 5-8 and accom-
panying text.
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
21. See ASR III, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10, 497 N.E.2d 33 (1988).
22. In ASR III, the Court of Appeals reversed the Third Department which had held
that the potential for profit was a non-essential element. See All Season Resorts v.
Abrams (ASR II), 491 N.Y.S.2d 516 (3d Dep't 1985), rev'd, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1988).
23. Id.
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licenses in New York, advocating that a participation interest in re-
alty is created and that the Martin Act is applicable to these licenses.
Part II discusses the interests created by timeshare licenses as they
relate to the real property concepts of license and lease. Part III ex-
amines the provisions and purpose of the Martin Act and the applica-
tion of the; profit potential theory to define the realty interests
requiring the Act's protection. Part IV advocates legislative and case
law alternatives to the New York "profit potential" approach. As a
case law alternative, the risk-capital theory, which focuses on "valua-
ble benefit" rather than "profit potential" will be discussed. As a leg-
islative alternative, proposed legislation General Business Law § 352-
eeeee, 24 classifying timeshares as participation interest in realty, will
also be addressed and advocated. This Note concludes in Part V that
timeshare licenses are participation interests in realty, creating a prop-
erty interest, regardless of profit potential, which requires consumer
protection under the Martin Act.
II. Interests Created In Timeshare Licenses
A. History and Construction of Timeshare Interests
Timeshare arrangements originated in Europe in the late 1960s as a
method of structuring vacation housing.25 The idea quickly spread to
the United States in the 1970s,26 with the first large scale project ap-
pearing in Hawaii in 1971.27 By 1982, growth records estimated that
600 timeshare projects existed, with 20,000 operational units and sales
24. S.3430-B and A.5378-B propose new GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 352-eeeee regu-
lating timeshares as participation interests in realty.
25. "Vacation timesharing began in Europe in the early 1960s. Marketed under the
name 'Eurotel,' individuals could purchase the right to the exclusive use of a vacation
facility for a specified period each year over a number of years." MADISON, supra note 9,
at § 10-2; see also Real Estate Law Newsletter, 11 COLO. LAW. 1543 (1982) [hereinafter
Real Estate Law Newsletter].
26. "Timesharing was a way for developers to market 'their previously unsaleable con-
dominium projects. Since a prospective purchaser could not afford to buy a whole condo-
minium, why not sell him a right to use that unit one or two weeks per year for a period
of years?" See P. ROHAN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE, § 17C.01 (1972); cf
MADISON & DWYER, supra note 9, at S10-2.
One commentator attributes timeshare development to the recession of 1976, when
"developers ... needed a highly leveraged 'bail out' of their failing projects .. " Real
Estate Law Newsletter, supra note 25, at 1543. Cf, Annotation, Regulation of Time-
Share Interval Ownership Interests in Real Estate, 6 A.L.R. 4TH 1288, 1289 n.2. [hereinaf-
ter Ownership Interests].
27. The Hawaiian project contained about 150 units. TIMESHARE BINDER, supra
note 4, at 1-3.
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volumes approaching 1.5 billion dollars.2" In 1988, commentators es-
timated that timeshare owners in the United States numbered
400,000.29 Created by contract, these timeshare arrangements confer
certain rights of possession upon the purchaser, usually based upon an
underlying condominium or cooperative arrangement.3 °
Many states have enacted legislation to protect the interests of the
community in the structure of timeshare arrangements." These laws
vary from state to state,32 but most, at least in structuring timeshare
arrangements, abide by a uniform act: either the Model Uniform
Real Estate Time-Share Act (MURETSA),33 or the ALDA/
NARELLO Act.34 MURETSA offers a comprehensive definition of
timeshare interests, establishing two types of timeshare arrangements.
Timeshare estates35 involve a right to occupy, coupled with a freehold
estate or an estate for years.36 Since fee ownership is conveyed, the
buyer holds a deed to the property37 and assumes all the rights that
accompany fee ownership, such as the ability to deduct interest and
real estate tax payments, to build up equity and to convey, devise, or
transfer his interest.3
28. "Since 1975 timesharing in the United States has grown into a billion-dollar in-
dustry." MADISON, supra note 9, at S10-2, n.69.
See INGERSOLL, Introduction, Glossary of Terms and Checklist for Federal Regulatory
Concerns for Timesharing, reprinted in The Legal Aspects of Real Estate Timesharing,
supra note 4, at 13.
29. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 9, at S10-2.
30. Rohan & Furlong, Timesharing and Consumer Protection: A Precis for Attorneys,
10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 13, 15 (1983) [hereinafter Rohan & Furlong]; see also Own-
ership Interests, supra note 26, at 1289.
31. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
33. MURETSA, developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association, offers a detailed and
lengthy approach to the timesharing concept. See TIMESHARE BINDER § 10.02[1], supra
note 4, at 10-5; see also Bloch, supra note 9, at 291.
34. The ALDA/NARELLO ACT was the first uniform time share act, developed during
the late 1970s by the National Time Sharing Council of the American Land Development
Association (ALDA) together with the National Association of Real Estate License Law
Officials (NARELLO). The Act was adopted in its entirety by Nebraska, and used as a
basis in the formulation of laws in several other states, including Florida, Hawaii, Ten-
nessee and Virginia. The Narello Act treats timesharing as separate from real property or
contract law and is criticized as insufficient because the Act offers "nothing indicating
how the plans are to be construed ... and the courts are forced to resort to the applica-
tion of common law principles." See TIMESHARE BINDER § 10.02[1], supra note 4, at 10-
5.
35. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
36. MURETSA § 1-102(14) (1985 & Supp. 1990).
37. Rohan & Furlong, supra note 30, at 16.
38. Id at 18-19; MADISON & DWYER, supra note 9, at S10-4.
[Vol. XVII
1989] TIMESHARING INTERESTS 511
Unlike a timeshare estate, a timeshare license39 is not coupled with
a freehold estate or an estate for years. 4 The purchaser's rights are
determined almost exclusively through the written contract.4 There-
fore, the purchaser's ability to convey his interest may be limited
through the contract provisions.4" For example, the contract may
prohibit conveyances without management approval,4 3 as well as re-
strict or prohibit profits on a conveyance.' Some contracts allow a
buyer to select a particular unit to be occupied, while others place in
the manager the power to select the particular unit upon notification
by the buyer of an intent to occupy some unit.a5 In short, the interest
in property in a timeshare license varies widely according to the terms
of the agreement.4 6
B. Preserving Concepts of Real Property Licenses
Timeshare licenses are usually consistent with the real property
concept of a license 7 or a lease a.4  A license is "a privilege to do one
or more acts on the land, without having an interest therein. As a
general proposition, it is personal to the licensee, is not assignable by
him and is revocable by the licensor." 9
39. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
40. MURETSA § 1-102(18) (1985 & Supp. 1990).
41. See Rohan & Furlong, supra note 30, at 17. MURETSA also provides for the
rescission of a contract due to unconscionability. See MURETSA § 1-105, Unconsciona-
ble Agreement or Term of Contract.
42. See Cal-Am v. Department of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 456, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 731 (1980) (members could transfer all rights under the memberships with
consent of the developers).
43. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 187,
361 P.2d 906, 907 (1961) (en banc).
44. "[T]he inclusion of a clause in a sales contract . . . prohibiting resales of
timeshares at a profit will protect the developer from any misunderstanding [regarding]
the investment sales pitch." See Bloch, supra note 9, at 307; see also ASR 111, 68 N.Y.2d
81, 86, 497 N.E.2d 33, 35, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (1988), where "[tihe price paid on a
transfer [could] not exceed the original purchase price plus the reasonable cost of the
transfer."
45. Some licenses do not allow members to specify the dates of occupancy in advance
but require reservations. See Nevada v. Carriage House, 94 Nev. 707, 709, 585 P.2d
1337, 1338 (1978); see also Cal-Am, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731; ASR
111, 68 N.Y.2d at 86, 497 N.E.2d at 35, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
46. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
49. Yager Pontiac, Inc., v. Fred A. Danker & Sons, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 546, 550, 330
N.Y.S.2d 409, 414 (1972), aff'd, 41 A.D.2d 366, 343 N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1973),
aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 707, 13 N.E.2d 340, 356 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1974); see also Harmatz v.
Glickman, 13 Misc. 2d 271, 272, 176 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1958); Kaypar Corp. v. Fosterport
Realty Corp., I Misc. 2d 469, 471, 69 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (1947); see also 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D
§ 195.
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Because a license does not convey or imply an interest in the land,5
a license is the lowest order of privilege touching or affecting real
property."' Timeshare contracts are treated as timeshare licenses
when they contain rights that are limited regarding alienability and
exclusive possession.52 In fact, many owners and developers will limit
the interests conveyed to the purchaser, insuring the creation of a li-
cense and avoiding federal and state regulations. 3 By limiting the
interests conveyed, regulation of the license is also limited. In some
cases "[tihe various types of [right to use] timesharing were developed
to escape federal and state regulations governing the marketing of se-
curities or interests in real property."54
Some contracts, however, provide additional rights which ulti-
mately destroy the license-nature of the arrangement. For example,
where the contract allows purchasers to choose the particular unit of
use or occupancy, such an allowance creates a right of exclusive pos-
session. 5 Any conveyance of exclusive possession of the premises as
against the world, including the owner, creates not a license, but an
irrevocable estate or interest in land.
56
Whether or not exclusive possession or control of any specific area
is granted is of great importance in determining whether a license
or lease is constituted. If a contract confers exclusive possession as
against the whole world, it is a lease; but if it merely confers a
privilege to use or occupy under the owner, it is a license.57
50. Id.
51. See Schnipper v. Florwood Realty Corp., 113 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 122 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1953); see also 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D § 196.
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53. "[A]voidance of both federal and state securities is difficult. If a membership
time-shared offering can be structured ... then it is possible for the offeror to avoid costly
and time-consuming securities regulation ... [o]bviously, every offeror should seek quali-
fied advice at an early stage of project evolution to determine whether securities problems
exist, and if so, whether it is possible to structure the offering so as to avoid such
problems." Ellsworth & Prendergast, Securities Maze Awaits Resort Time-Share Offer-
ings, reprinted in The Legal Aspects of Real Estate Timesharing, supra note 4, at 403,
[hereinafter Ellsworth & Prendergast]; see also TIMESHARE BINDER § 3.02[4][a], supra
note 4, at 3-6.
54. Rohan & Furlong, supra note 30, at 17; see supra notes 41, 53 and accompanying
text.
55. See infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text. Where exclusive possession is cre-
ated, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act may apply, requiring filing of state-
ment of record and property report. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a
discussion of ILSFDA applicability to condominium sales.
56. See New York v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 298, 333 N.E.2d 361, 372
N.Y.S.2d 56 (1975); Williams v. Hylan, 223 App. Div. 48, 227 N.Y.S. 392 (lst Dep't),
aff'd, 248 N.Y. 616 (1928); see also 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D § 196.
57. See Polner v. Arling Realty, Inc., 194 Misc. 831, 88 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1949); Roches-
ter Poster Advertising Co., v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 213 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1961), aff'd, 15
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Consequently, many owners and managers structure the contract to
eliminate any signs of granting a right of exclusive possession. 8
At least one court has held that the right of exclusive possession is
created with the specification of weeks for use or occupancy together
with a defined and specific right to occupy. 9 In Cal-Am v. Depart-
ment of Real Estate,6° members purchased up to four one-week time
share interests, but were not entitled to reserve particular units.6 ' The
developers, RHAC, assigned the particular units, although members
specified dates, making reservations at least sixty days in advance.6"
Members could transfer their interest with the consent of RHAC and
bequeath their interest without consent.63 The California Court of
Appeals found that an interest in real. property was created by the
club memberships:6" "[d]espite [RHAC's] contentions, the fact that
RHAC retains the right to specify which unit will be occupied . . .
does not derogate the exclusive possessory interests of the members
during their annual periods of one to four weeks."6
The court considered any type of exclusive occupancy "even for
only a portion of each year ... [as placing the occupant in] a special
position with relation to a portion of the condominium premises.., it
is an estate or interest or possessory interest in the property itself."
66
Retention by the seller of the right to specify units and provide main-
tenance did not alter the nature of the exclusive possession.6 7 The
buyer's specification of dates of occupancy, together with the contrac-
tual right to occupy a unit, gave a right of exclusive possession suffi-
A.D.2d 632, 222 N.Y.S.2d 688 (4th Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1036, 183 N.E.2d 911,
230 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1962)..
For a discussion of distinctions between license and lease see 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D § 199 at
332; People ex rel McGoldrick v. Regency Park Inc., 201 Misc. 109, 110 N.Y.S.2d 163,
aff'd, 280 App. Div. 804, 113 N.Y.S.2d 172 (2d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 650, 112
N.E.2d 425 (1953); Scroll Realty Corp. v. Mandell, 195 Misc. 2d 972, 92 N.Y.S.2d 813
(1949); Shepard Warehouses Inc. v. Scherman, 63 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1946).
58. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. See also discussion of Cal-Am
Corp. v. Dep't of Real Estate, infra notes 59-71 and accompanying text. There, the Royal
Hawaiian Adventure Club (RHAC) chose the units on a first come, first served basis.
59. Cal-Am Corp. v. Dep't of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729,
132 (1980).
60. Id. at 456, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. "The membership interests sold by appellant constitute interests in real prop-
erty." Id. at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
65. Id. at 458, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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cient to constitute an interest in real property.6" The memberships
were, therefore, more like leases than licenses.69
Arguably, according to the court's reasoning, a hotel room reserva-
tion could also be considered as conveying a right to exclusive posses-
sion because the reserving party has the right to occupy a unit on
dates specified by that party. 70 A hotel room reservation, however,
does not rise to the level of the property interest involved in Cal-Am
because the buyers in Cal-Am had a right to exclusive possession of
the unit, whereas a hotel occupant's rights of possession are limited by
those of the hotel owner. Furthermore, a person who sues for breach
of a timeshare contract can recover expectancy damages, whereas a
consumer who sues for breach of a hotel room reservation can only
recover any downpayment or out-of-pocket expenses he actually
made.7' Thus, unlike the contract in Cal-Am, a hotel room reserva-
tion confers only a license, i.e., a right to use or occupy a unit of real
estate.72
C. Creation of Leases and Hybrids
A lease creates a present interest and estate in land by conveying a
right of exclusive possession in the lessee as against the world (includ-
ing the lessor)73 for purposes not prohibited by terms of the lease. 74 A
contract, therefore, which allows for exclusive possession, either
through choice of units, specification of dates or the ability to convey
the interest to another, may be considered a lease, rather than a li-
cense, creating an interest in property.75
The Cal-Am court, however, was unwilling to classify the member-
ships as leases, saying, "[iut is unnecessary to assign a name to the
interest thus created."'76 The element of exclusive possession, how-
ever, established an interest in the property itself, similar to a lease-
68. Id. at 458, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
69. "While it is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to classify the interest in
real property thus created, the nature of the interest is that of a lease." Id. at 457, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 732.
70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of innkeeper/guest
liability regarding reservations, see Dickerson, Travel Consumer Fraud: Rip-Offs and
Remedies, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 847 (1977) [hereinafter Travel Consumer Fraud]; see
also Kellogg v. Commodore Hotel, 187 Misc. 319, 64 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1946).
71. See Travel Consumer Fraud, supra note 70, at 860-62.
72. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
73. See Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 213 N.Y.S.2d 812,
(1961), aff'd, 15 A.D.2d 632, 222 N.Y.S.2d 688 (4th Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1036,
183 N.E.2d 911, 230 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1962); see also 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D § 199.
74. See also 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D, § 199.
75. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
76. Cal-Am Corp. v. Dep't of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 457, 163 Cal. Rptr.
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hold. "Regardless of the term used to describe the purchaser's rights
of exclusive occupancy, it is an estate or interest or possessory interest
in the property itself."'77
In State of Nevada v. Carriage House,78 however, the court held
that neither a license nor a lease was created in a timeshare arrange-
ment. In Carriage House,79 members purchased a contractual right
to reserve a suite for occupancy seven days each year, but were not
entitled to make reservations for particular dates or units.80 The
memberships were irrevocable, transferrable by gift, devise or consent
of the management,8 1 and subleases and rentals were prohibited.82
The interests lasted for the useful life of the building, estimated at
forty to sixty years.83 The court held that the memberships "fail[ed]
to achieve the status of an interest in real property ' 84 because the
interests created by the agreements defied the real property concepts
of license and lease. "Indeed, it is not a license as defined by the law of
real property, because it is irrevocable and transferrable. Nor is it a
lease because it is not definite as to its duration or description of the
property involved."85 The court did not specify what type of interest
was created by the agreements, although it concluded that the legisla-
ture should amend the statutes to adequately regulate timeshare
interests. 86
The Cal-Am court distinguished the result in Carriage House on the
facts of both cases. 87 The Cal-Am arrangements resembled leases not
just because members held a right to occupy together with power to
specify dates, but also because the dates of duration were so specific,
much like leases which are specific as to duration. 8 RHAC members
held their memberships until exactly December 31, 2041. This date
729, 732 (quoting Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 191, 22 P.2d 694, 697 (1933)) (citations
omitted).
77. Id. at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
78. State of Nevada v. Carriage House Assoc., 94 Nev. 707, 709, 585 P.2d 1337, 1339
(1978).
79. Id. at 707, 585 P.2d at 1337.
80. Id. at 709, 585 P.2d at 1338.
81. Carriage House Associates was the management body. Id. at 709, 585 P.2d at
1338.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 709-10, 585 P.2d at 1339.
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. The court construed NRS ch. 119 and 645 which delineate licensing requirements
for interests in real property. Id. at 708, 585 P.2d at 1338.
87. 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732.
88. Id.
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was so specific as to resemble a lease.89 In Carriage House, however,
the court pointed out, the members held their interests for the useful
life of the building, which is an estimated period rather than a specific
duration. Leases cannot be ambiguous regarding duration.90 Accord-
ing to both Cal-Am and Carriage House, leases specify dates and du-
ration and convey a contractual right to occupy. 9' When a timeshare
agreement possesses these elements, it will be held to constitute a
lease, thereby conveying an interest in the property.92
Ability to convey one's right to occupy may also evidence exclusive
possession. 93 The contract provisions control the type of timeshare
created by delineating a freehold estate or a license. Conveyance pro-
visions usually accompany only the estate-type timeshares, since an
estate in fee is created. 94 Indeed, with estate-type timeshares, the con-
tract need not provide for conveyances, since a deed is transferred to
the purchaser.95 Some license-type timeshare contracts allow limited
conveyances. For example, in Carriage House, members could trans-
fer their interests by gift or devise or with the written approval of the
management.96 The court found no property interest existed. 97 In All
Seasons Resorts v. Abrams (ASR II1), 91 members were not allowed to
transfer or convey their interests within two years of acquisition, ex-
cept to family members; thereafter, only two transfers were allowed
and resale could occur only once.9 9 The Court of Appeals held that a
property interest did not exist."o The court looked to the conveyance
provisions in the contract for some intent to give exclusive possession.
The restrictions on conveying or transferring one's membership in
ASR III defeated a property interest by eliminating an investment op-
portunity: "To prevent the acquisition or sale of memberships for in-
vestment purposes, the agreement imposes restrictions upon the
alienation of memberships."' 10
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
95. See Rohan & Furlong, supra note 30, at 16.
96. Id. at 709, 585 P.2d at 1338.
97. Id. In Cal-Am, however, members could only transfer their interests by bequest or
with consent of RHAC. There the court found no property interest existed. See supra
notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
98. 68 N.Y.2d 81, 497 N.E.2d 33, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1986).
99. Id at 85-86, 497 N.E.2d at 35, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
100. Id. at 86, 497 N.E.2d at 35, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
101. Id. For discussion of exclusive possession as an interest in real property, see supra
notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
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III. Martin Act Protection And Realty Interests
The type of interest created in realty determines whether it must
conform with New York's Blue Sky Law, 0 2 also known as the Martin
Act.10 3 Created to protect the public from fraudulent exploitation in
the offer and sale of securities,"° the Martin Act, by its provisions,
also governs the real estate market."0 5 Section 352-e of the General
Business Law provides:
It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, partnership, cor-
poration, company, trust or association, or any agent or employee
thereof, to make or take part in a public offering or sale in or from
the state of New York of securities constituted of participation in-
terests in real estate, mortgages or leases, including stocks, bonds,
debentures, evidences of interest or indebtedness, limited partner-
ship interests or other security or securities as defined in section
[352] of this article, when such securities consist primarily of par-
ticipation interests or investments in one or more real estate ventures,
including cooperative interests in realty, unless and until there shall
have been filed with the department of law, prior to such offering, a
written statement or statements, to be known as an "offering state-
ment" or "prospectus" concerning the contemplated offering. .06
The statute confers jurisdiction upon the Attorney General over
any realty or securities offerings within and outside of New York State
made through advertisements, mailings, etc."17 The Attorney General
has the duty to prevent fraudulent practices 1 by launching investiga-
tions,1°9 invoking injunctive relief,'10 and pursuing criminal prosecu-
102. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (Practice Commentary) (McKinney 1988).
105. "The Martin Act is a 'hybrid' statute governing two distinct and critical areas of
the economy-the securities and real estate market places." Id.
106. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1988) (emphasis added).
107. See In re Cenvill Communities, Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 418, 419, 372 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284
(1975) (court affirmed order requiring Florida-based corporations and residents to appear
for depositions in New York State regarding advertisements within the state for proper-
ties located outside the state.); Ledgebrook Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 77 Misc. 2d 867, 354
N.Y.S.2d 318, 322 (1974) (Connecticut corporation advertisements constituted public of-
fering, requiring filing with the Attorney General).
108. "[T]he broad powers granted by the New York legislature to the Attorney Gen-
eral in the regulation of condominiums [is] not restricted to the filing of offering plans...
[H]e is given authority to curb 'fraudulent practices'... It is in this context that the word
offering must be construed." See In re Cenvill, 82 Misc. 2d at 420-421, 372 N.Y.S.2d at
285; see also Ledgebrook, 77 Misc. 2d at 871-72, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 323, discussing adver-
tisement as offering as a rational inducement for out-of-state developers to file prospectus,
thereby protecting New York citizens from "unscrupulous promotion."
109. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1988).
110. Id. § 353.
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tions"' for Martin Act violations. 12
Because the Act does not define the terms "securities," "participa-
tion interests in realty," or "cooperative interests in realty," the At-
torney General's jurisdiction over license-type timeshare agreements
is questionable. For example, if a timeshare agreement conveys some
right to exclusive possession, it may convey a "participation interest
in realty," requiring the developers to file a prospectus and comply
fully with the disclosure requirements under General Business Law
section 352-e. Conversely, timeshare agreements that possess license
characteristics and do not convey any elements of exclusive possession
retain their license status, convey no "participation interest in realty"
and need not comply with these disclosure requirements. Thus, in
order to determine whether the Martin Act applies, the courts ex-
amine the terms of the timeshare agreement to discern a participation
interest or cooperative interest in realty.
A. Cooperative Interests in Realty and Individual Ownership
New York Courts have provided little assistance in defining the re-
alty interests within the Martin Act. The All Seasons court," 3 how-
ever, did directly address the issue of cooperative interests in realty. 1
4
There, the court held that cooperative interests in realty require a
conveyance of individual ownership or an individual interest in the
property as evidenced by ownership of units, stock or shares." 5 Co-
operatives, condominiums and homeowner associations each convey
ownership interests which qualify them as cooperative interests in re-
alty." '6 The Court held, however, that the All Seasons memberships
did not so qualify because none of the ownership elements were
present. "17
B. Investment Contract Theory of Profit Potential and
Participation Interests
The "investment contract theory," espoused by the Supreme Court
111. See id. §§ 352-d, 358.
112. "[T]he Martin Act confers upon the Attorney General some of the broadest and
most potent investigative powers." See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (Practice Commen-
tary) (McKinney 1988).
113. 68 N.Y.2d 81, 90-91, 497 N.E.2d 33, 38, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 (1986).
114. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
115. Id.; see also ASR 111, 68 N.Y.2d at 90-91, 497 N.E.2d at 38, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
116. Id.
117. 68 N.Y.2d at 91, 497 N.E.2d at 38, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 15. See infra notes 136-48
and accompanying text.
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in SEC v. Howey, l l8 is inexorably linked to the securities field. There,
the Court held that the major consideration in determining whether
or not a security exists is the role that profit or investment plays in the
venture, i.e., whether the arrangement is an "investment contract"'" 19
negotiated by the buyer for profit rather than merely for housing.
Profit potential, therefore, is presently the basis for defining a security
interest within the securities field. 120
The Martin Act, however, applies not only to traditional securities
interests such as those contemplated by the Court in Howey, but also
to interests in realty.' 2 ' Where the federal securities laws might not
regulate certain securities because they have no potential for profit,
such securities might fall within the scope of the Martin Act because
they constitute "cooperative interests in realty" or "participation in-
terests in realty." Such was the case in United Housing Foundation v.
Forman,12 2 where the Court, construing the federal securities laws,
applied the investment contract analysis.'22 The Court held that co-
operative interests in realty did not constitute securities because the
purchasers were more interested in housing than making a profit from
their investment. 124 In Forman, the tenants of Co-op City in New
York alleged federal securities and civil rights violations in the sale of
common stock to the United Housing Foundation.' The tenants, in
order to occupy an apartment, were required to purchase eighteen
shares of stock per room. 126 The shares, explicitly tied to the apart-
ment, could not be transferred to a non-tenant, nor pledged or encum-
bered.'22 No voting rights attached to the shares, and the shares
descended only to surviving spouses.128 Tenants wishing to move had
to offer their shares to the developer at the initial price, and in any
event, could not resell shares at a profit. 129
The Court, reversing the Second Circuit,' engaged primarily in
the investment contract analysis, based upon Congressional intent in
118. 328 U.S. 293, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946).
119. The Howey Court defines an investment contract as: "a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Id. at 298-99.
120. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. 421 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
123. Id. at 851-54.
124. Id. at 854.
125. Id. at 840.
126. Id. at 842.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 842-43.
130. Id. at 847.
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enacting the Securities Acts.' 31 "The primary purpose of the Acts of
1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregu-
lated securities market. The focus of the Acts is on the capital market
of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to raise capital for
profit-making purposes . *.".., The Court found, therefore, that
"the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized low-
cost living space; it was not to invest for profit."' 13 3
The subsidized realty interests in Forman, however, qualify as co-
operative interests in realty under the Martin Act and, therefore,
would require filing with the Attorney General. 3 4 Unlike the federal
securities acts at issue in Forman, the Martin Act explicitly applies to
cooperatives, condominiums and homewowner associations, regard-
less of profit potential.' 35 License-type timeshare agreements, how-
ever, introduce a different concept: whether an ownership interest,
similar to that present in cooperative or condominium arrangements
is created by the timeshare agreement, requiring the application of the
Martin Act. Under the federal securities laws, such timeshares would
not constitute securities unless a potential for profit is present. 36
Since New York State expressly included these realty interests in the
Act, profit potential could not have been the only criteria for deter-
mining the existence of a security. Thus, one can infer a legislative
intent to protect purchasers of real estate regardless of profit
potential.
Recently, however, the New York Court of Appeals, applying the
investment contract theory, held that timeshare licenses which do not
involve a profit margin, but involve mere use or occupancy do not
131. Forman, 421 U.S. at 847-48.
132. Id. at 849.
133. Id. at 851.
134. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
135. The Forman court found that:
[t]he primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious
abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is on
the capital market of the enterprise system; the sale of securities to raise capital
for profit-making purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded and
the need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors.
Because securities transactions are economic in character Congress intended the
application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction. ...
421 U.S. at 849.
The Martin Act, however, is designed to protect consumers from fraudulent practices
and explicitly enumerates "cooperative interests in realty" as within the purview of the
Act. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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require Martin Act protection.'37 In ASR III, '8 buyers were offered
membership in campgrounds outside of New York State. No right or
interest in the property was conveyed, nor any share of income or
gains or voting rights in the campground. 3 9 Members could only
transfer their memberships to family members within the first two
years, and thereafter were restricted to two transfers and only one
sale."4 The court, applying an investment contract analysis, con-
strued "participation interests in realty" to require some type of in-
vestment contract. 4 ' "It is significant that 'participation interests'
are treated in the statute not as a separate category but as being
equivalent to and virtually synonymous with 'investments.' Wherever
the words 'participation interests' appear in the statute they are paired
with the word 'investments' in the phrase 'participation interests or
investments.' "42 The court held that where an interest in realty is
created which does not include an interest in profit-making or invest-
ments, protection from the Martin Act is not required.'43
The Third Department, however, considering the same case, found
no necessary correlation between participation interests and profit po-
tential or investments."' In All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams (ASR
I), "'45 the court found that a very narrow reading of the Martin Act's
protection resulted from the undue emphasis placed on profit poten-
tial and investment. 46 "The fact that the [legislature included par-
ticipation interests along with the phrase 'cooperative interests in
realty' indicates that it intended that the statute cover, non profit or
'consumer-type' securities as well as investment securities."' 147  Con-
tinuing its analysis, the court construed the Act broadly, advocating
that the Act's purpose was to protect the public, regardless of profit
potential. 48 The court noted that a participation interest was created
137. See ASR III, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 497 N.E.2d 33, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10, (1986).
138. Id.
139. 68 N.Y.2d at 85, 497 N.E.2d at 35, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
140. Id. at 85-86, 497 N.E.2d at 35, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
141. Id. at 89, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 14, 497 N.E.2d at 37.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams (ASR II), 109 A.D.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 516
(3d Dep't 1985), rev'd, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 497 N.E.2d 33, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1986).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 191, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 518, rev'd, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 497 N.E.2d at 33, 506
N.Y.S.2d 10.
148. "[The Martin Act] should be flexibly interpreted to effectuate its purpose to afford
potential investors, purchasers and participants an adequate basis upon which to found
their judgments." Id. at 192, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 519, rev'd, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10,
497 N.E.2d 33.
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because the buyers had an interest in the financial well-being of the
property and the All Seasons organization itself.'49
Application of an investment contract analysis, which the Howey
Court extracted from the federal securities laws, is inappropriate in
New York, where the Martin Act, unlike the federal securities laws,
includes realty interests in its definition of "security." The Third De-
partment accurately assessed the consumer protection nature of the
Act, broadly construing its provisions to render protection to those
consumers who invest money without intention of receiving a profit.
The federal securities laws were created, according to Forman and
Howey, to offer protection against fraudulent practices for "invest-
ment contracts."' 5 ° The Martin Act, by including realty interests, ap-
plies its protections beyond "investment contract" situations to the
context of realty interests.
IV. Case Law and Legislative Alternatives
A. Risk-Capital Analysis As A Case Law Alternative
Rather than apply the investment contract analysis, many state
courts engage in a risk capital analysis of the realty interest.' 5 ' In
applying the risk capital analysis, the court considers the "valuable
benefit" inuring to the purchaser by placing his capital at risk in the
enterprise. 52 Generally, if a state adopts the risk capital analysis, "it
may view the use of a resort condominium, campground or hotel suite
as the benefit which will accrue to the purchaser of a timeshare."' 53
The theory was clearly espoused by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in
State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc. 151 In Hawaii Market, realty inter-
ests were not at stake, but memberships in an enterprise involving
sales and commissions were. Founder members purchased a sewing
machine or cookware and were then eligible to earn money through
many activities, including referrals. 55 The court engaged in a risk
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
151. "[R]isk capital theory has been adopted in such states as California, Alaska, Ha-
waii, Oregon, Washington and Oklahoma .. " Bloch, supra note 9, at 301. See State v.
Hawaii Market Center, 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961).
152. "[T]he initial [investment] is induced by the offeror's promises or representations
which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over
and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise ... " Hawaii, 52 Haw. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109; see also Bloch, supra note 9, at
300.
153. See Bloch, supra note 9, at 300.
154. 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
155. Id. at 644, 485 P.2d at 107.
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capital analysis, finding that the investment contract theory espoused
by Howey was too restrictive, "[leading] courts to analyse (sic) invest-
ment projects mechanically, based on a narrow concept of investor
participation."' 56 The members were unequivocally exposed to risks
and should, therefore, be protected.' 57
Similarly, in Silver Hills Country Club v. Superior Court,5 ' pur-
chasers were entitled to protection under California's securities act
regardless of profit potential.15 9 There, the members paid to use the
services of the club and had no rights in the income or assets of the
club.' 6 ° Memberships were transferrable, but only to persons ap-
proved by the board of directors.' 6 ' Construing the California Blue
Sky Law, the Silver Hills court found that the memberships conveyed
a "beneficial interest in title to property,"'' 62 and applied a risk-capital
analysis, rather than the investment contract/profit potential analysis:
[Developers] are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a
business for profit. The purchaser's risk is not lessened merely be-
cause the interest he purchases is labelled a membership. Only be-
cause he risks his capital along with other purchasers can there be
any chance that the benefits of club membership will
materialize. '63
The court found that the legislature designed the definition of "se-
curity" broadly so "to protect the public against spurious schemes,
however ingeniously devised, to attract risk capital."' 64 As in Califor-
nia, application of the risk capital analysis generally results in protec-
tion of a purchaser's interests under that state's securities acts by
requiring compliance with disclosure provisions. "I Even without a
156. Id. at 647, 485 P.2d at 108.
157. Id.; see also Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906,
13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (en banc).
158. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186.
159. "[W]hether or not they expect[ed] a return on their capital .. " Id. at 812, 361
P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
160. Id. at 811, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
161. Id.
162. California Corporations Code § 25008(b) defines "security" as:"[a]ny stock, in-
cluding treasury stock; any certificate of interest or participation; any certificate of inter-
est in a profit sharing agreement; any certificate of interest in an oil, gas or mining title or
lease; any transferrable share, investment contract, or beneficial interest in title to prop-
erty, profits, or earnings." CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008(b) (West 1988); see also Silver
Hills, 55 Cal. 2d at 812, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
163. 55 Cal. 2d at 813, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
164. 55 Cal. 2d at 812, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
165. "If there is evidence ... that a state follows the risk capital theory, the developer
should realize that he may be subject to securities regulation." Bloch, supra note 9, at
301.
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profit motive, investors are protected from the risk of losing invested
capital. 166
The Martin Act was also drafted to broadly extend protection from
fraudulent exploitation. 167 New York courts, however, have applied
the investment contract analysis, rather than the risk-capital analysis
to determine whether license-type timeshare interests are covered by
the Martin Act.' 6 The Court of Appeals in ASR II refused to even
consider a risk-capital analysis: "[T]he memberships could not consti-
tute securities even under a 'risk capital' analysis, [and] we need not
decide whether, under other circumstances, the Silver Hills ... rule or
some variant of it could prove to be a helpful addition to the 'Howey
test' . .. 169
Application of the investment contract analysis to a statute, such as
the Martin Act, designed to broadly encompass realty interests,
would thwart the consumer purpose of the Act. The risk-capital the-
ory allows the court to consider the capital at risk without intent to
reap a profit. Ignorance of these interests neutralizes the purpose of
the Martin Act. Developers would not be required to disclose infor-
mation to purchasers, nor would the Attorney General have jurisdic-
tion over any possible fraudulent activities, eliminating any criminal
sanctions. Remaining civil liability would depend solely upon the
provisions of the contract, resulting only in compensation to plaintiffs,
rather than protection of purchasers from fraudulent activities. The
risk-capital analysis, then, rather than an investment contract analy-
sis, more accurately considers the interests at stake in determining
whether the Martin Act applies to license-type timeshares.
B. Timeshare Provisions as a Legislative Alternative
The New York State Department of Law agrees with the Third
Department, and has requested legislation classifying timeshares as
"participation interests in realty."'7 ° Proposed section 352-eeeee of
the General Business Law provides:
166. "The significant difference between the two theories for timesharing ... is that the
risk capital theory interprets "profits" as a "valuable benefit." Bloch, supra note 9, at
300.
167. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
168. See ASR III, 68 N.Y.2d at 94, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 18, 497 N.E.2d at 40, where the
court refused to consider the risk capital test, dismissing it as not a helpful addition to the
Howey test for determining the existence of a security under New York law; see also N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (Practice Commentary) (McKinney 1988).
169. ASR III, 68 N.Y.2d at 94, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 18, 497 N.E.2d at 40.
170. The Department of Law supports the proposed legislation. See ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL LEGISLATIVE MEMORANDUM No. 298-89; see also Proposed Legislation S.3430
and A.5378, proposing new ARTICLE 31, MEMBERSHIP CAMPGROUNDS.
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TIMESHARING INTERESTS
All the provisions of this articles, including the requirements for
filing an offering plan with the department of law pursuant to
(§ 352-e) of this article, shall be fully applicable to any public offer-
ing or sale in or from the state of any timeshares. Timeshares are
hereby deemed to be participation interests in real estate covered
by (§ 352-e) of this article. 171
Any ambiguity involving the application of "participation interests
in realty" to timeshares is thus eliminated. The Department of Law
declares the legislation necessary, in light of ASR III, "to clarify the
Attorney General's jurisdiction to regulate all timeshare sales. Other-
wise, sponsors may begin to structure their contracts -conveying right
to use timeshares in order to try to come under the All Seasons excep-
tion to the Department of Law's jurisdiction." ' For example, a
sponsor may construct a right to use contract as a club membership,
similar to the All Season memberships, specifically to avoid Martin
Act regulations and Attorney General jurisdiction.
The proposed legislation not only requires filing with the Depart-
ment of Law for all timeshares, but also allows a seven day cooling off
period during which purchasers may rescind the purchase contract. 173
Unfair marketing practices which might coerce a purchase are neu-
tralized by the purchaser's ability to cancel. The right to rescind the
contract is not waivable by either party. 174 Most states require this
right of rescission-an "effective remedy for 'overzealous' sales-
men."'175 Because the proposed legislation clearly classifies timeshares
as participation interests in realty, and further provides purchasers
with the right to rescind the contract, consumers would have ade-
quate protection from "unscrupulous promotion."' 176
171. Proposed GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 352-eeeee was first introduced in 1987 and
passedthe Assembly in 1988 as A.7259. A similar bill had been introduced in 1983.
172. ATrORNEY GENERAL LEGISLATIVE MEMORANDUM No. 298-89.
173. Proposed General Business Law § 352-eeeee(3)(a)(i) provides:
(a) Purchaser's right to cancel contract.
(i) The purchaser may cancel a contract to purchase a timeshare with or without
cause within seven business days after the execution of the contract or within
seven business days after the purchaser has received the prospectus filed with the
department of law under (§ 352-e) of this article, whichever is later;
174. Proposed General Business Law § 352-eeeee(3)(a)(ii) provides:
(ii) The right to cancel provided in this paragraph may not be waived by a
purchaser under any circumstances. Any instrument executed by a pur-
chaser which purports to waive such right shall be deemed void and of no
effect;
175. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 9, at S10-5.
176. See Ledgebrook, 77 Misc. 2d at 871, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
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IV. Conclusion
The Martin Act, unlike the Federal Securities Laws, was clearly
established to protect consumers from fraud within both the securities
and real estate markets. New York courts, then, should emphasize,
not the role of profits and investments, but whether an investor's capi-
tal is at risk, in determining whether the protections of the Martin
Act apply. By considering risk rather than "profit potential," more
consumer activities and investments would be protected, regardless of
expectations of profit.
The legislature should also confer jurisdiction upon the Attorney
General in timeshare offerings by adopting proposed General Busi-
ness Law 352-eeeee, allowing a non-waivable seven day cancellation
period. By so doing, the Martin Act would expressly apply to all
timeshare arrangements, eliminating any ambiguities regarding devel-
opers' compliance with disclosure requirements and the Attorney
General's ability to prosecute violators.
Yvette C. Mendez
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